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One ol'   the  primary concerns  of  many Americans   in the 
years   immediately   fallowing  World War   11 was   the new  inter- 
national   position of   the United States,     l'rior  to this   time 
America   hao  been  able   to  remain  somewhat   aloof   from  many 
world   problems.     Secure   in   her   isolated   geogiaphical   position, 
the  Unite*' States  did  not have   to fear   ph>sicai   aggression 
without ample   notice.     The   lecbuologj   which  proouced guided 
missiles,   rntUn ,   and  the  ntouir   bonb   cervnl   to alter  this 
oir  of complnconcy.     finny  individuals   pointed   to traditional 
American  unreadiness   for war and   propose*)  a   plun ol   universal 
militnry   training  as   protection   for  America.     This   plan,   it 
was   argued,   would   provide   the   United  States   with   enough 
military   potential   that   aggresbiou  would   be  deterred.      In 
addition,   such a  program would   enable America   to maintain 
her   dominant   position  of  world   power   and  encourage   peace 
through  police  action. 
Opponents   of   UMT   favored  nntioual   defense and world 
peace;   bat,   not   through l   vystcm which   they argued  would  lead 
to  militarism   in  America.     Various   liberal   oriented  groups 
presented   arguments   against   UMT,   many   of   them  basud   upon 
ideologicaJ   ;,rouii.:s.     The   doubt   most   often  SXprsaaad   in 
regard  to   the   nanfnlttOOf of  a   universal   military  training 
program was   its  ability  to   provido defense without   creating 
a  militaristic   nation.     Many   individuals   also  argued   thai 
the  adoption   of   UliT  would   defeat   the   pur .on K   of   the  newly 
created   United  Nations  by  appearing   to  ohallenge   ite  effective- 
ness.     From a   practical   liMdpollt,   a  nujor  Br^uwent  was   the 
need   for   improved   technology,   not   n.reat   masses   ol   wen,   for 
defense   in  the   future. 
The   ideas  expressed  during  the  course  of   thin  debate 
are  related  to  the  new American  role   in world  affairs.     Friiiary 
considerotion  has  been  tiven  to  the   ideas   themselves,   rather 
than n   detailed   onuinntion of  those   individuals   present lag 
them.     The  nature  of  the   postwar  world,   especially  the   un- 
certainty nLout   the   future,  resulted   in a  compromise  on  this 
issue  with  neither  side  achieving  complete  satisfaction. 
It   is,   however,   an   interesting  e>anple  of   American ability 
to  ai-'o^it   ideals   to  practical   needs  and  somehow  retain a 
balanced  an<!  workable  structure  of  national   defense. 
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The post-World War II debate over the adoption of a 
universal military training system in America ivas replete 
with controversy and complexity.  This del.ate was only a 
segment of the overall general discussion of America's 
role in the postwar world.  Various groups expressed 
opinions upon this topic and the result was an overlapping 
of ideas among organized pressure groups.  Due to considera- 
tions of time and space, no attempt has been made to present 
a detailed discussion of each organization's reasons for 
favoring or opposing UMT.  The primary concern of the paper 
is to differentiate between tin- basic arguments and attempt 
to determine the general support for these opinions.  What 
is offered, therefore, is a study of the most prevalent 
ideas which were expressed in regard to UMT, with primary 
emphasis upon the content of the major arguments. 
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INTKODUCTION 
A.     UMT: Nothing New 
Universal Military Training is fundamentally the practice 
of requiring every able-bodied male citizen of a nation to 
undergo a fixed period of basio military instruction, usually 
beginning when he reaches a certain age.  The training is not 
designed to convert the youth into a soldier, but is intended 
to teach hiu the elements of military discipline and procedure. 
It is also designed to introduce the fundamental aspects of 
soldiering so that any subsequent training can concentrate on 
advanced techniques arter a brief "refresher" period.  This 
differs from conscription in that UMT contemplates the training 
of the youth of an entire nation; couscription merely selects 
a certain number of those youth to serve in the military forces 
In addition, the conscript must serve n full term oT duty (for 
a specified period of time) and is released from his military 
obligation; the UMT trainee, on the other hand, receives basic 
training and remains subject to service at a later date. 
UMT is, of course, for all practical purposes a form of 
conscription.  it is universal rather than selective and is 
intended only for training r>urpoe«S, not for service.  It is 
not intended to replace selective conscription for service; 
the latter would be necessary if a sufficient number of 
volunteers could not be obtained.  Conscription, universal 
and selective, is the method utilized most often to obtain 
military personnel.  There have been advocates of UMT as the 
basis of American military policy since the nation oame into 
being. 
It may be laid down as a primary position, 
and the basis of our system, that every 
Citizen who enjoys the protection of a 
free government, owes not only a proportion 
of his property, but even of his personal 
services to the defence of it, and conse- 
quently that the Citizens of America (with 
a few legal and official exceptions) from 
18 to 50 years of age should be borne on 
the Militia Rolls, provided with uniform 
Arms, and so far accustomed to the use of 
them, that the total strength of the Country 
might be called forth at a Short Notice on 
any very interesting Emergency  
This concept, advanced by George Washington, was 
prefaced by referenoe to the Swiss system and the usage of 
ancient Greece and Home.2  Since 1783 the primary advocates 
of this type of military system have not strayed from the 
basic premise that a universally trained and equipped citizenry 
is the best means of protection for the United States.  This 
viewpoint was, however, partially submerged for over a century. 
Even though selective conscription was employed by both sides 
during the American Civil War, UMT was not seriously considered 
as a solution to American military problems.  This is 
probably due to the lack of concern about world problems 
during the Nineteenth Century and the preoccupation with 
political and economic changes within the country.  Except 
for the first quarter of the century, America did not have 
to worry about defending herself against a major foreign 
power. 
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Lack of concern over national defense was a reflection 
of the general population's desire to remain aloof from 
Europe's problems, an attitude which resulted in America's 
being unprepared for every major war in which she became 
engaged from 1812 through 1950.  The situation was relieved 
somewhat in 1917 and 1941 because the United States had, 
in a sense, been given advance notice of her probable partici- 
pation in the conflicts and ample opportunity to achieve enough 
basic preparation to accomplish her objectives.  In both 
instances, even with some measure of warning, this lack 
of preparation and the subsequent need to hurry and to 
Improvise in order to fight led many responsible people 
to think in terms of constant preparedness. 
Immediately after World War I the arguments for 
UMT and national readiness were lost among the more 
insistent issues of Prohibition, Prosperity, and finally, 
Depression.  Also, a strong deterrent to cries for military 
preparation was the idea that World War I would be the 
"War to end War". America fought only when forced to fight 
and many felt that it could not happen again, at least not 
in the foreseeable future.  To support this opinion it was 
pointed out that Germany had been reduced to a pauper nation, 
devoid of any aggressive capability. A minority, principally 
military personnel, were concerned with America's retreat 
behind the walls of isolationism and the nation's domestic 
interests.  This earlier concern, and the destruction of 
the idea that another great war would not occur, prompted 
a resurgence of interest in UMT and national defense in 
the period following that second great war of the Twentieth 
Century.  After seeing their hopes for peace shattered by 
the marching of Hitler's legions, many resolved to work to- 
ward keeping America in a state of constant preparedness 
in order to deter any future aggressor nation from repeating 
the actions of 1914 and 1939. 
B.  America after World War II 
The period 1945 to 1950 is crucial in any study of 
American world politics and military attitudes and accom- 
plishments during the second half of the Twentieth Century. 
It was an era of discussion, analysis, and formulation of 
American military policy.  Decisions made during these years 
have influenced all subsequent military and diplomatic 
thinking not only within the United States but throughout 
the world.  America, as the world's greatest military 
power in 1945, was a determining force in the world. 
Whether one likes it or not, armed force in being is a 
powerful influence.  Suggestions of mighty military nations 
are more readily followed than those sdvanced by weaker 
powers.  At the same time a single, strong nation poses a 
threat to its neighbors and its strength influences its 
attitude toward other nations and their reaction.  The 
basic problem now, as then, is to achieve a balance; a 
nation needs strength so that it cannot be dominated yet 
must remain not so strong that it appears to threaten 
other notions.  Tbe key to achieving and maintaining this 
balance is latent power—the ability to mobilize, organize, 
and utilize all of a nation's potential strength in as 
short a time as possible.  This must be done without main- 
taining the military at its full capacity, for then militarism 
replaces democracy and safety becomes only a word. 
Americans in the late 1940's were deeply concerned 
with being secure from aggression.  Two world wars had 
been fought in less than fifty years, what was to prevent 
a third?  In addition, the United States was no longer 
one of the world's powers, it was the world power.  To 
tb- foremost military leaders of America, Generals 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and George C. Marshall, this meant 
that the United States had to live up to Its responsi- 
bility by enforcing the peace.  Preparation, the ability 
to respond to any aggression Immediately, was the primary 
factor in their considerations.  They remembered the rapid 
demobilization of 191b-1919 and the resulting weak America. 
One of their chief points was the need for strong leader- 
ship by America or, at the very least, military strength. 
It is not enough that we devise every kind 
of international machinery to keep the 
peace.  We must also be strong ourselves. 
Weakness cannot co-operate with anything. 
Only strength can co-operate....J 
Eisenhower's words, spoken before the end of World War II, 
concisely illustrate the viewpoint of the military, the 
national administration, and, to a certain degree, the 
public.  In general, almost everyone wanted America to be 
strong, but could not reach agreement as to the means of 
achieving and maintaining this strength.  One of the 
key disputes centered upon the professional versus the 
amateur soldier. 
American tradition held that military professionalism 
was not the best solution.  Bunker Hill, the Alamo, 
Gettysburg, Belleau Wood, and the Bulge were fought by 
amateurs, not professionals.  America had always sought 
the answer to her military problems by turning to the part- 
time volunteer and the conscript.  With the exception of 
naval operations, all American wars were fought by the 
citizen-soldier, and dependence upon the conscripted 
citizen-soldier was necessary for the bigger wars.  That 
this created problems can be seen by the following opinion, 
expressed prior to American entry into World War I, of 
one student of military history: 
"But what did conscription really signify?... 
It meant substituting the ordinary citizen 
for the professional soldier; it meant sending 
up to the firing line not men ready and willing 
to face the supreme risk but men for the most 
part with no such disposition, ordinary 
citizens, professional men, lawyers, merchants, 
artists, even in one country today, priests."4 
Yet, no other solution was offered, for the alternative 
seemed to be surrender.  In a modern war a nation utilizes 
all of its resouroes in order to fight.  Millions of men 
and women are needed by the armed forces in order to carry 
on the oonflict.  If past experience was indicative of the 
future then the next great war would see practically every 
American in uniform.  To the pro-UMT faction this situation 
made it mandatory for the nation to protect itself hy 
training its entire population to be ready for the next 
war. 
This was the position adopted by the military: 
universal military training was imperative and the sooner 
it was instituted the better.  Following the same basic 
argument, the national administration chose to temper 
its plan by calling for universal training.  This latter 
concept was intended to go beyond purely military training 
and would serve to improve the entire population.  It was 
also designed to have wider public appeal since it was 
aimed at some of the nation's educational and health 
problems also; however, the military would be responsible 
for administering the program.  Universal Training was 
merely a more palatable term for UMT.  This then was the 
basic position of the military and Administration:  UMT 
was vital and must be adopted immediately. 
UMT as the solution to the nation's problems was 
unacceptable to many people.  Although they, of course, 
also favored a strong America, they did not feel that UMT 
would serve the purpose for which it was intended.  Opposing 
the plan were many religious groups, clergymen, public 
school teachers and officials, organized labor groups, the 
Socialist party, and civilian experts (including scientific 
and technical as well as military).  These groups argued 
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that UMT was not morally justifiable in view of Americans 
beliefs and practices, that in any case it was unlikely 
either to prevent war or provide the United States with 
adequate preparation lor war, and it was not worth the cost, 
either in money or the reversal of cherished traditions. 
Their basic contention, that UMT was against American ideals, 
is best advocated by the argument against peacetime 
conscription advanced by President Woodrow tfilson in 1914. 
It is said in some quarters that we are 
not prepared for war.  What is meant by 
being prepared?  Is it meant that we 
are not ready upon brief notice to put 
a nation in the field, a nation of men 
trained to arms?  Of course we are not 
ready to do that; and we shall never 
be in time of peace so long as we retain 
our present politipal principles and 
institutions ■ 
The solution to America's post-war manpower problem 
was, therefore, anything but simple, and the fact that so 
many different plans of training were introduced adds still 
further to the complexity,  basically, the problem remained 
the same: some means ot  assuring American strength in the 
post-war world was needed and it was necessary to determine 
if the best method was UMT.  Arguments that were advanced 
for and against such a program will be presented and 
evaluated in terms of their appeal to the public, and their 
influence upon the decisions; and this writer's judgment of 
their validity or invalidity will be expressed.  No attempt 
will be made to differentiate between the various plans that 
were offered as they principally involve differences in detail 
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and organization, the basic reason remains the same.  Primary 
emphasis will be placed upon the following questions: (1) Was 
UMT really needed and, if so, why was it not adopted?  (2) Did 
the United States make a mistake by not adopting UMT in the 
late 1940's?  (3) What influence did the UMT controversy have 
upon the development of American military policy? 
No definite answers can be given, for the effects 
of the 1945-1950 debate over universal military training 
are still being felt.  It is hoped that some small insight 
into the significance of this debate will result from this 
study.  Since selective service (the draft) is still in 
effect and, seemingly, more necessary now than at any 
other "peacetime" period in American history, it is highly 
probable that UMT as a solution to the United States' 
defense problems is not yet a thing of the past.  In case 
it is not, the following arguments, yro and con, will 
probably be heard again, presented by the same groups, 
and possibly with the same result. 
II.  UMT:  Necessity for Survival 
A.  The National Administration 
From 1945 to 1950 the Chief Exeoutive of the United 
States government was in complete accord with proposals for 
universal military training.  President Harry S. Truman 
continually referred to the necessity of UMT as a basis 
for postwar military planning.  There was some mention of 
universal military training in every one of Truman's 
State of the Union messages; each one followed the same 
theme: 
A further step which I consider of even 
greater importance is the early provision 
for universal training.  There are many 
elements in a balanced national-security 
program, all interrelated and necessary, 
but universal training should be the 
foundation for them all.  A favorable 
decision by Congress at an early date 
is of world importance.  I am convinced 
that such action is vital to the security 
of this Nation and to the maintenance of 
its leadership.1 
Truman, on several oocasions, pointed out that UMT was not 
a new approach for him; his positions in the past were pre- 
decessors of his current program calling for universal 
training.2 
It becomes necessary here to distinguish between the 
terms "universal military training" and "universal training" 
The former designation was preferred and used extensively 
by the military and the public.  It also served as the 
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focal point of the attack on the program.  UMT was designer] 
solely to provide a mass, trained reserve of manpower for 
the Armed Forces, specifically the Army.  Conceived as o 
defense measure, its only intent was to provide for the 
rapid mobilization of men to be used in case of a sudden 
attack upon the United States or in case the need for a 
large army to fight elsewhere in the world should arise. 
Universal training was a more ambitious program designed 
primarily to increase the vigor and stamina of America by 
providing its youth with discipline, organized physical 
development, and some measure of medical and educational 
improvement.  Its basic purpose was much like that which 
the Job Corps of the 1960's is attempting to accomplish on 
a plan of voluntary participation.  Both programs were to 
be administered by militar> authorities with an eye to 
providing basic military training.  The latter term, 
universal training, seemed to be more palatable to the 
administration although the primary purpose was no 
different from UMT. 
This was what was unique about the plan I 
contemplated—it was a universal training 
program, not just a military program.  The 
educational and special training benefits 
were strong arguments in themselves for 
immediate legislation setting up the ... 
program.  But the basic reason for my pro- 
posed plan was still to guarantee the 
safety and freedom of the United States 
against any potential aggressor.■■ 
President Truman had very able help in presenting 
this program to the American people.  Both the Secretary 
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of War, itobert P. I'atterson, and the Secretary of the Navy, 
James Forrestal favored UMT and worked for Its adoption 
from 1945 to 1947.  After the reorganization of 1947 which 
consolidated the military establishment under Forrestal 
as the Secretary of Defense, their support weakened, 
primarily because of the complex problems of reorganization 
and the opposition of the new created Air Force to UMT 
proposals.  Forrestal became involved in the interservice 
dispute over the effectiveness of air superiority and mass 
bombing, and the result was less active support for UMT 
due to the need to achieve overall stability.  Afterl^47 
the chief administration official urging the adopting of 
UMT was Secretary of State George C. Marshall.  Earlier, 
as General of the Army and Chief of Staff, Marshall whole- 
heartedly endorsed the program of universal military training. 
As Secretary of State he continued to urge adoption of the 
propo»al arguing that it was indispensable to the defense 
planning of America. 
To Marshall, the United States after World War 11 
was charged with the responsibility of maintaining world 
peace and stability.  In addition, the United States could 
no longer rsly on a time lapse in which could begiu 
preparations to fight.  In the future the safety of America 
and the world depended upon the speed with which the country 
could react to overt aggression.   Furthermore, it was 
necessary for America to demonstrate to the world that she 
was both ready and capable of resisting aggression.  As 
Marshall expressed it: 
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The weakness ID our position is the 
international fear that we will insist 
on too idealistic a solution and at 
the same time decline to maintain the 
power to back up what we may demand of 
others in an agreement.5 
Diplomacy,without sufficient strength or the will to 
utilize it if necessary, was wasted, according to Marshall's 
thinking.  "Diplomatic action", he said, "without the 
backing of military strength in the present world can lead 
only to appeasement". 
Power was the Key to diplomacy and without the power 
to encourage or enforce a nation's wishes it was useless 
even to attempt a diplomatic solution to any problem. 
Harsh as it sc«ms, this candid view was shared l>y other 
influential members of the administration.  Secretaries 
of State Edward it. Stettinius (1944-1945) and James F. 
Byrnes (1945-1947) supported the idea of power diplomacy 
in the sense of "good" power being necessary for the pre- 
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servation of world freedom. 
...if we are going to do our part to 
maintain peace under law, we must main- 
tain in relation to other states, the 
military strength necessary to discharge 
our obligations. 
Force does not make right, but we 
must realize that in this imperfect 
world power as well as reason dges 
affect international decisions. 
If the United States were to avoid the mistakes it made 
between 191b and 1941 it was necesssry to move in a new 
direction.  No longer could America sit idly by and let 
Europe play power politics with the world as a testing 
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ground. It was imperative to abandon isolation and take 
an active part in formulating policy for the rest of the 
world. 
This abandonment of isolation must be complete in 
order to insure America's survival as well as live up to 
her responsibility.  Airplane design and atomic bombs 
would keep any future war from being isolated to any 
particular looation.  History showed that sudden and 
unsuspected attack was the favorite device of aggressors 
and now this attack could be worldwide and infinitely 
more destructive than ever before.  Technology advanced so 
rapidly that this destructive capability was an increasing 
potential, eventually able to destroy an entire continent 
with virtually no warning.  To the advocates of UMT this 
circumstance required an immense reserve manpower pool 
so that any emergency, especially a world-wide one, would 
be dealt with swiftly.  A large reserve of basically 
trained men would be able to act for internal security 
in case of a surprise attack against the United States. 
Their training would enable them to organize and help 
direct survival efforts throughout the country. 
The "Buck Rogers" type of warfare possible in the 
1960's was foreseen by many individuals in World War II 
weapons systems.  An important consideration of this new 
warfare was its ability to reach anyone anywhere. 
The addition of the atomic bomb to the 
incalculable horrora of modern war has 
eliminated the concept of zones of 
safety in a future attack devastating and 
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immediate la its impact, new developments 
in warfare have created a need for trained 
■en in every city and town—men who would 
be available at once in an emergency.' 
If this were really the case, as it turned out to be, then 
why not keep the military continually on a wartime basis? 
There were two chief objections: first, it would be contrary 
to all American tradition of not keeping large peacetime 
armies; and, second, it would cost entirely too much.  This 
latter reason, from the practical standpoint the most 
important, was conditioned by the American reaction to war. 
Once fought and won it was time to forget about it and 
return to "normal" peacetime activity.  Any money spent 
for defense should be spent on research and development 
anyway since modern weapons were so powerful and soon obsolete, 
Pro-UMT rebuttal pointed out that research, while 
necessary, was useless without a supply of weapons and 
men trained to handle them.  Trained manpower was the most 
essential ingredient, especially in view of the shorter 
and shorter time periods available for such training. 
Basic training given early, and to everyone, would allow 
advanced training to be given in less time and in conjunction 
with refresher physical training.  In addition, UMT 
would force the professional military personnel continually 
to re-educate themselves in order that they too would keep 
abreast of scientific developments.  Leadership qualities 
of the armed services would benefit both through constant 
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use and the early development of potential leaders for later 
service.10  The Military establishment was to be the 
adninistrator of any program and receive the greatest 
benefit.  The military favored a program of universal 
military training, but for slightly different reasons. 
B.  The Military Thought 
Because of intra-service pressure against debating 
military differences in public, professional military 
attitudes are difficult to ascertain.  The true military 
opinion of UMT proposals can perhaps never be determined 
with finality, but it is significant that the two most 
important military leaders favored the adoption of UMT. 
George C. Marshall, as Chief of Staff and later as 
Secretary of State, was its foremost advocate.  His 
position and basic arguments never changed during the 
1945-1950 period.  UMT was the sine qua non of America's 
post-war defense planning; without it ail else was doomed 
to failure.  Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General of 
the Army in 1945-6 and Chief of Staff 1946-7, also remained 
firm in his conviction that universal military training 
was vital to American and world safety.  Fast experience 
was the basis for both men's arguments, and especially 
the time factor. 
The dangers of forgetting the lessons 
of our past increase tremendously.  We 
have seen the frightening speed with 
whloh the mechanics of military force 
become more complicated.  The great 
mobilization of 1917 seems leisurely 
compared to the efforts we have just 
been through. 
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And yet, la this last war, we took two 
and a half years to begin the offensive 
in Western Europe and more than that to 
bring our first forces back to the 
Philippines.  Should future threats arise, 
no one will contend that we shall have 
tine for comparable preparations.11 
After American proorastination in two previous wars, both 
Marshall and Eisenhower feared that she would not be 
allowed the luxury of Europe's initiating the conflict 
and allowing America to Join in whenever she wanted.  The 
ability rapidly and efficiently to mobilize the entiro 
nation for defense was essential.  In order to achieve 
this potential for mobilization it was necessary to main- 
tain reserve forces sufficient to fight in a world conflict. 
A primary goal of the Army was to Insure that needed 
reserve forces would be available if needed.  In the category 
of reserves were the National Guard, the organized Army 
iteserve, and the inactive reserve.  This latter group was a 
"paper reserve", almost wholly comprised of veterans.  I'rior 
to World War II the National Guard and the organized Army 
iteserve were the main forces relied upon Tor additions to 
the standing army.  These groups were volunteer organizations 
and, while experience showed that volunteers made better 
soldiers, not enough men were willing to volunteer. 
The President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training 
in 1947 found that, 
On the basis of its present analysis of 
emergency military needs, the Army con- 
siders a National Guard of 723,000 
essential.  Before the last war, through 
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reliance  on voluntary  methods   of  enlist- 
ment,   the  Guard  had  a   peak  strength of 
less  than  200,000. 
Nearly 2 years  after  the  conclusion  of 
World War   II,   the Guard  has  about  one- 
ninth of   its  723,000 quota,   and  few of 
these  are  enlisted  men.     Although  one- 
third  of  the 6,000  contemplated  Guard 
units  have  been organized  and   federally 
inspected,   these  units  are  mostly  on 
paper  or  consist  only  of  top  officers 
with a   small  cadre  of  non-commissioned 
officers  and  specialists.13 
The  regular Army of  postwar America  was   in  no  better 
condition.     From a   peak  of  b,300,000   in May  1945  the Army 
wan  down  to 3,300,000 by January  1946.     At  that   time, 
Eisenhower  estimated  that   the  minimum  number  of   personnel 
necessary  to the Army's  effectiveness  wan   1,500,000.     The   then 
current   plans  of Congress  called  for an Army  of  only  550,000 
by July  1946,  most   of  these  being  professionals.     According 
to Eisenhower,   the  only way  of  meeting  the Army's   manpower 
needs  was  to  draft   50,000  men  a  month,   more  than  twice  the 
number  drafted   in December  of   1945.1A    By  194b   it  appeared 
that   the Army  had   lost   its   battle  to   increase   the  number  of 
regular  troops.     The regular Army  remained  at   500,000  until 
the  Korean  crisis   required  far greater  numbers. 15 Even in 
1950, as earlier crises foretold, it was impossible to fill 
the ranks with volunteers. 
No real explanation is available for the inability 
of American governments to induce enough younti men to 
volunteer for military service in times of enduring crisis. 
The problem existed in 1776 and persists tode^; military 
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manpower procurement problems in the 1960*8 are basically 
the same as in the Eighteenth Century.  When no crisis exists, 
the inducements to volunteer for military service are 
noticeably lacking.  The outbreak of crisis generally pro- 
duces an enthusiasm to "join up" and "get it over with"; 
but, as the conflict is prolonged this attitude rapidly 
disappears,  llesort to conscription becomes necessary and 
the conscripts soon outnumber the volunteers.  Prior to 
1940 it was not as serious a problem since the country 
was not encumbered with foreign obligations and worldwide 
responsibility.  World War II ended this complacency, but 
the problem had been recognized much earlier. 
American military leaders of World War I seemed to 
recognize this fundamental unwillingness to volunteer and 
its resulting effect upon the military needs of America. 
General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff in 1919, felt that 
UMT was essential because, "... a 1914-lb type mass army 
could not be prepared without peacetime conscription". 
This Idea is further supported by the later comments or 
Walter Millis, the noted military historian, 
Our statesmen and soldiers have rarely been 
willing frankly to face up to it; but the 
fact is that the vision of a 'small regular 
Army supported by a great reserve of citizens 
trained to arms' is a vision only, requiring 
universal peacetime conscription to infuse 
it with reality.18 
Efforts to institute UMT immediately after World War I were 
lost in the return to prosperity.  All the elements were 
present for a decision in favor of UMT: trained men, masses 
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of equipment, a fully productive economy, and evidence of 
19 need.    Most of the basic arguments of 1945 were exactly 
the same; and, once again, the leading generals were at the 
forefront of the agitation for UMT. 
General Eisenhower argued against the apparent lack 
of need for a mass army.  Even though the advent of nuclear 
weapons and advanoed techniques of delivering them to a 
target seemed to belie the necessity of a large army, 
Eisenhower felt that, "...we cannot permit complacency 
or an 'atomic bomb mentality' - a possible modern counter- 
part of the 'Maginot Line Mentality' - to lull us into 
another postwar apathy."20 This viewpoint was shared by 
one of America's technological leaders, Karl T. Compton, 
President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 
later chairman of the President's Advisory Commission on 
Universal Training.  Compton stated unequivocally that 
UMT was even more necessary in the modern world.  In 1945 
he declared: 
Technological developments have greatly 
changed the conception of an effective 
citizens' army...a much longer period 
of training is necessary...The training 
itself must be largely technical.  More 
important still, the speed of transportation 
and the development of methods for making 
powerful attacks with great suddenness 
and at a great distance mean that it is 
no longer safe to wait until war breaks 
out to begin the intensive training of 
our armies.21 
Longer, more highly specialized technical training was 
definitely needed for the future soldier.  The question 
was whether it would be effective for the citizen soldier. 
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To this the military answered with an emphatic affirma- 
tlve; if nothing else it would help the individual prepare 
for civilian work.  Even Bore important was the contention 
that, at the very least, some prewar training is better 
than none at all. 
...since most of us over the years have 
been amateurs in war, we have tended to 
accept two persistent fallacies characteristic 
of superficial students of military policy: 
the first, that by a process of improvisation 
military victory can be achieved cheaply 
by the employment of some particular arm, 
doctrine, or policy.22 
Furthermore, this prewar training would enable the 
military better to decide exactly what function a man 
could perform best.  It would also allow the military 
to be better informed about their own needs and capabilities. 
By preparing everyone in peace time, any subsequent 
conflict would require less effort in organization of the 
nation's forces.  General Tompkins went on to say: 
The military history of the past three 
years has proved onoe again that in 
modern warfare between first-class 
powers, every resource, human and material, 
of the nations will be mobilized for the 
battle. 
...The problem is not one of decision on 
limited employment of armed forces, but 
one rather of the selective allocation 
of the entire manpower of the nation to 
the direct needs of the military, the 
requirements of material production, 
and the minimum essential maintenance 
of the civilian economy.*" 
The military continually urged that prewar training be 
provided for every able-bodied male citizen.  There would 
be no chance for preparation the next time.  "Discipline 
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and training—wide-spread discipline and training—will 
24 be necessary from the outset of any new world tragedy", 
said General Eisenhower, for the safety of America depended 
upon the immediate instillation of these traits into every 
American male so that he would not be caught unaware when 
the first blow fell.25 
It would appear, then, that the United States military 
establishment was more concerned with when the next war 
would start rather than Jif it would start.  It is somewhat 
unfair to portray these men as unduly warlike, for they 
undoubtedly were not.  The military attitude was characterized 
by a strong current of fatalism (or realism), based upon 
the preceding events of the Twentieth Century.  To American 
military leaders the following assumptions were the basis 
of their postwar defense plans:  first, the United States 
would be the first nation attacked; second, the aggressor 
would strike suddenly and powerfully from a great distance; 
third, immediate reaction and retaliation were necessary 
for survival; and finally, "there will be no time in which 
to prepare for the successful defense of our country if 
we wait until we are in danger".26  Technology, which 
was one of the chief arguments against UMT, provided any 
aggressor with "...a capability of sudden attack that 
;annot be safely ignored in military planning". 
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To meet the ever constant threat of surprise attack 
it would be "necessary to maintain n large reserve over 
2b 
and above the forces constituting strength in being". 
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Voluntary enlistments were not even sufficient to maintain 
an adequate force in readiness, therefore the only logical 
conclusion was to adopt UMT in order to provide for the 
defense and safety of the country.  This could be done 
without violating either the traditional preoepts of 
the United States or the tenets of democracy.  It must 
be adopted quiokly; the longer America waited the poorer 
her defense structure became.  The American people must 
be convinced quickly that UMT was vital to national defense. 
Walter Millis describes the urgency of the United States' 
military position in the later 1940*1 in these words: 
There were not enough ground troops to 
implement even the existing emergency 
war plan; to send anything more than a 
division anywhere would necessitate 
partial mobilization, while even the 
small authorized strengths were wasting 
away for lack of recruits... "Up to the 
present time, 'as Forrestal had already 
written February 10 to Chan Gurney, 
chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee,'we have not found any 
feasible alternative to UMT as a means 
of providing the necessary trained 
personnel for the Jjfjtional Guard and 
the Reserve.' .... 
The American public seemed to be aware of the problem; but, 
evidently not concerned enough to act.  It must be remembered, 
however, that once again America had just completed a total 
war effort.  Many people were not able seriously to consider 
such a radical departure from tradition as UMT. 
C.  Public Opinion 
The shock of 1'earl Harbor appears to be the key to 
understanding public reaction to UMT.  Japan's swift and 
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devastating attack brought a real sense of fear to the 
American people and is probably one of the most important 
single reasons contributing to the abandonment of Isolation. 
Advanced technology made it imperative for the United States 
defense system to cope with the possibility of surprise 
attack.  Mark Sullivan, a Washington Post writer, sunned 
up this attitude in 1945: 
One thing we should have learned from 
the suddenness of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. As Under Secretary of State 
Grew put it in the hearing this week, 
"Latent power is not enough'. Our 
power should be trained and ready for 
instant action.. 30 
Obvious to everyone, this situation created a real need for 
some method which would assure the United States of protection. 
The United Nations was the hope of those searching for 
permanent peace and stability.  To Sullivan, and many others, 
the United Nations organization was definitely needed, but, 
"at the same time, by permanent universal military training, 
and by other means, we must be prepared for war in case 
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the peace organization should fail to work". 
American faith in world peace was not shattered, even 
though strained.  The primary goal was still co-operation 
of nations achieved through an organization such as the 
U.N.  Past experience indicated that something more was 
needed, "...as insurance against contingencies such as 
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those many of us doubted could happen in the 1930'i". 
To be respeoted it was necessary to also be strong.  "It 
is to forget realities to say that human nature has changed 
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so much within the past few years that a strong nation, 
bent upon aggression, respects anything less than equal or 
33 superior strength", said one Congressional commentator. 
This attitude was not confined to the military and 
diplomatic sphere; sharing this viewpoint were many 
educators, authors, and historians. Amont those desiring 
that the United States maintain its military strength 
was Virginia C. Glldersleeve, Dean of Barnard College and 
a delegate to the 1945 San Francisco Conference.  This need 
to remain strong militarily was essential, at least until 
the U. N. proved itself capable of maintaining world peace. 
As she expressed it, "Unless we have force behind us, our 
opinion in the world of today will not carry much weight. 
That is an unpleasant fact, but it 1B a fact." 
In the war of words over the merits of UMT civilian 
"experts" on military affairs were fairly evenly divided. 
Two prominent military historians, Douglas Southall Freeman 
and Fletcher Pratt, favored UMT.  To the House Select 
Committee on Postwar Military l'olicy, Freeman stated that, 
"...our Military policy prior to the Second World War was 
a negation, in whole or in part of every principle that 
should have been applied".35 According to Freeman, the 
only reason American foroes managed to keep from being 
completely destroyed in the early days o. World War II 
was that Selective Service had been instituted prior to 
active combat.  Ho went on to say that, "...compulsory 
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military service, properly administered, has been proved 
to be the surest, most democratic, and most economical 
system of essential national defense". 
The economy referred to by Freeman wns not only found 
in savings of money, but, even more important, in lives. 
One of the failures of the previous system wns l lack of 
command training for officers, nnd UMT would provide this 
critical training in peacetime.    Pratt also highlighted 
the benefits of prewar training to the modern soldier.  In 
1951 he wrote, 
The modern infantryman is required to 
have a thorough familiarity with at 
least three weapons that existed only 
ia the experimental stage in 1945, 
besides knowing all the 1945 soldier 
had to know about the older weapons 
and such purely tactical matters as 
scouting, petroling, camouflage and 
communications.  More new weapons arc 
coming. b 
He also emphasized the need for recognizing and developing 
leadership qualities prior to actual combat.  Additional 
long term benefits would be increased teohnical knowledge 
for use in civilian life, as well as better physical health. 
In addition to Karl Compton, some other prominent 
educators favoring UMT were Charles Seymour, diplomatic 
historian and President of Yale University, and James 
Bryant Conant, Harvard President.  Primarily educators, 
these men cannot, perhaps, be characterized as technical 
experts, but neither can they be accused of being warmongers. 
Their positions as heads of two of America's greatest liberal 
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arts institutions and their backgrounds, Seymour in history 
and Conant in chemistry, indicate that they could not be 
grouped with the generally conservative supporters of UMT. 
Doth felt it absolutely necessary that the nation adopt 
some form of universal training or service in order to 
meet American defense needs.  Conant's viewpoint, expressed 
in Look magazine, December 19, 1950, was admittedly based 
upon the need for manpower in Korea.  His argument affirmed 
that universal military service was the only way to meet 
current manpower needs, especially in view of America's 
worldwide responsibilities. 
Charles Seymour, basing his argument on past history 
and current needs, asserted in 1945: "1 am in favor of 
compulsory military training for all able-bodied American 
young men as an essential basis Tor the protection of 
American interests and international peace in a confused 
postwar world..."   Concerned about another possible 
retreat into isolation, Seymour strongly advocated that 
America play an active role in world affairs.  As the 
most powerful nation in the world, "The United States 
cannot divest itself of responsibility for the settlement 
of international problems, and this responsibility cannot 
be fulfilled except the nation dispose of organized force". 
There was a catch to this position; even though Seymour 
favored the abolition of aggression and armed conflict, he 
argued: 
...the  history  of  the   past   twenty-five 
years  makes  clear   that  men  are   far  from 
eliminating  force  or the  threat  of   force 
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from their social relations...Underlying 
any machinery for the prevention of war 
there must be organized power and the wore 
effective that power the greater is the 
chance that it will not have to be used... 
if the United States is actually going 
to assume a role of responsibility in 
protecting the peace of the world, it 
must have at its disposal an adequate 
military establishment to serve as the 
authority upon which our policy ami our 
actions shall be based.43 
Seymour's argument seemed to restate the proposition that 
"might makes right".  To Seymour, this was not the case, 
but America needed power in order to survive and prevent 
the world's aggressor nations from usurping the rights of 
others. 
Congress and the general public were by no means 
apart and aloof from the debate over universal military 
training,  representative Andrew J. May (D., Ky.), on 
January 3, 1945, introduced a bill to institute universal 
military training.  House resolution 515, in the 79th 
Congress, 1st Session, was designed to provide either 
army or navy training for all able-bodied male citizens 
of the United States as soon after their eighteenth birth- 
day as possible.    Introduction of this bill prior to 
the end of World War II reinforces the viewpoint that UMT 
was not a sudden innovation to deal with postwar problems. 
Concern that America would retreat into her isolationist 
shell following the war and allow her military system to 
become stagnant is reflected in the opening line of House 
resolution 515: 
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De it enacted...the Congress hereby declares 
that the reservoir of trained manpower built 
up at such enormous expense during the present 
war should not be permitted to become empty 
again as after World War I, but should 
be perpetuated for the peace and security 
of future generations.45 
The House Committee on Military Affairs hearings on the 
May Bill, in November and December, 1945, was the second 
of four official studies involving the question of UMT. 
In 1945, two House Committees exomined the question 
of United States postwar policy, both diplomatic and 
military.  The House Select Committee on Postwar Military 
Policy, meeting in June, 1945, was more concerned with 
the overall American position in the world.  Although 
the Committee took more than 600 pages of testimony from 
interested and informed individuals, it never released 
a clearcut summary or statement of position.  A similar 
result occurred when the House Committee on Military Affairs, 
after two months and over 600 pages of hearings, failed to 
report the May Bill in any form.  Again, in 194h, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee held a month-long series 
of hearings specifically on UMT.  More than 1100 pages 
later the committee issued no positive statement in regard 
to its findings or opinion. 
Lack of clearly delineated Congressional opinion on 
UMT is one of the difficult aspects of the UMT controversy. 
It is relatively easy to point out some proponents of the 
plan.  Senator. Chan Gurney (D., I. Dakota), Henry Cabot 
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Lodge (H., Mass.) aud Lyndon 13. Johnson (l). , Toas) favored 
the adoption of some form of UMT.  In the House of ileprcsenta- 
tives, Andrew J. May (D., Ky.), John J. Sparkman (fl. , Ala.), 
Carl Vinson (U. , Ga.) and J. Buell Snyder (l>., Pa.) were 
in favor of UMT at the earliest possible time.46  but 
there are not enough expressions of opinion to enable 
the investigator to trace a pattern.  In general, con- 
servatives tended to favor UMT, but this assertion is 
basod only upon the "high visibility" of the more out- 
spoken advocates of the plan, and the generalization 
cannot be readily verified.  The failure to give forth- 
right statements may be explained by the nature of the 
194b election situation und by the uncertain state of 
the world in 1945, causing Congress to wait before com- 
mitting itself too deeply. 
President Truman definitely favored universal 
military training, and, since he appeared to be out of 
favor with the American electorate in 194b, most repre- 
sentatives at least felt it better to wait.  One ex- 
planation for UMT's not being adopted is found in the 
nature of American politics in 1946 and 194b.  No real 
postwar direction was evident in 1946 and many elective 
officials were not going to risk their political careers 
upon so controversial an issue as UMT.  Again, in 194b, 
the identification of universal training with President 
Truman's policies probably kept many officials from advo- 
cating its acceptance.  The question then arises, did the 
American electorate favor UMT? 
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Polls cannot  be considered as  absolutely  reflecting 
the  true  situution,  but   they can reflect  trends, 
especially over several years.     A  series  of  public 
opinion  polls  from 1945 to  1950  included questions 
on UMT specifically,   and  the role and   strength of  the 
United State6  and   its  military organization   in general. 
Results   of  these   polls  show that a  majority of Americans 
favored  UMT in  the   later   1940's and that most were  not 
convinced   that   the  U.   N.   was   the   panacea   for  the world's 
problems.     Throughout World War  II  opinion   favored UMT 
as a   postwar  project,  with 60  per cent   or  more Americans 
for   this   idea.47     During  the   last  year of  the war  this 
figure  jumped  to over 70   per cent.4t    From 1945   through 
1947   the   percentage  of Americans   favoring UMT ranged 
from 65   to 76, with most   polls  showing about  70  per  cent 
49 in  favor. 
In regard   to  public   opinion about UMT,   the  critical 
year  was   194b,   the  first   postwar year  in which  the  electorate 
could Hkl a   decision,     For  this year  results   of  the   polls 
show  that UMT was favored   by more   than 70   per  cent  of   the 
population.50     In addition to  the  questions  about  UMT the 
pollsters also asked   if   the United States  would  have  to 
fight  another war within  the next   ten years.     In  June, 
1947,   about  one-half  thought  that America would   fight 
again  in  ten years.51     One year   later  that   figure went 
up to 5b per cent, and rose to 67 per cent in July, 194b. 
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One wonders that the population of the United States, 
overwhelmingly favoring UMT, was not given an opportunity 
to decide the issue.  Even then it is not at all certain 
that the question would be resolved in favor of UMT. 
I'ubiic attitude was such that, in the words of one 
student of the issue, "on specific issues of military 
policy... the public tended to favor measures which 
symbolized or could be interpreted as meaning greater 
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military preparedness"; ' but, favoring a policy and voting 
for it do not necessarily coincide. 
It is possible that cooler and wiser heads pre- 
vailed and that the lack of decision regarding UMT was 
for the good of the country. Then again, it may have 
been due to the nature of UMT'a opponents. The issue 
was most definitely not a one-sided debate; the anti- 
UMT faction was small, but decidely vociferous. 
III.  UMT:  Not Really Needed 
A. Moral Opposition 
Many opponents of Universal Military Training based 
their opposition upon the argument that such a system was 
not morally right.  Christian and democratic Ideals pre- 
vented the adoption of universal conscription.  This 
segment of the opposition to UMT-comprising churches, 
Christian and other religious groups, church affiliated 
individuals, and Socialists-was the most outspoken. 
The basis for their argument was the militarization 
which would result from a program of universal military 
training.  The editors of the Christian Century attacked 
the program proposed by Eisenhower in 1945.   Conceding 
the logic and candor of the General's position, they 
continued: 
Here is one of the most revealing and 
at the same time frightening arguments 
for peacetime conscription ever advanced 
in a democratic society...the one thing 
a year of military service can do 
ineradlcably is to provide 'psychological 2 
indoctrination' in the military viewpoint. 
Further castigating the military approach to UMT the editors 
went on to say: 
It is foolish, therefore, to look to the 
generals to formulate the national 
policy which will be expected to pro- 
duce this true security.  The generals 
seek a nation habituated to the word 
of command.  But a nation habituated 
to the word of command is not a democracy. 
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On the contrary, it is a nation that 
is most in danger, when crisis cones, 
of submitting to the tyranny of a 
dictator.3 
UMT to many was militarism, plain and simple, regardless of 
any protection it might provide. 
Protection of the United States against foreign 
enemies was not the main concern of the "moralist" groups. 
Their primary concern was protection of America against 
itself; against the somewhat reactionary and cynical 
elements in her society who preached military strength as 
a cure-all for war.  Of course, these groups wanted the 
United States to be strong; but, strength was not reflected 
by conscription.  "Our national strength and world power 
lie not only in our magnificient natural and human re- 
sources but also in (l) a productive economy and (2) a 
vigorous moral sense and devotion to worthy ideals."4 
In addition, America already had a reservoir of trained 
manpower, more than ten million veterans of World War II. 
It was considered highly unlikely that if another war 
broke out in the near future this group would be exempt 
from service.  For at least five years the United States 
was perfectly safe and in the early 1950's it would be in 
a better position to determine its true military manpower 
needs. 
One of the most effective arguments against the 
President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training's 
wholehearted support of UMT was the time factor.  As 
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stated by Norman Thomas, leader of the Socialist Party 
and chairman of tbe Postwar World Council, the argument 
ran like this: 
The last definite date that it Mentions 
is 1955 by which tine it believes that 
other nations—it means Russia—will 
be able to wage atonic warfare effectively. 
Within that period, the Commission argues 
that the United States cannot conquer, 
■uch less police, Europe without mass 
armies.  This, despite our enormous 
naval superiority which the Commission 
conveniently overlooks and our monopoly 
of atonic bonbs.  Obviously what we 
cannot do within that period in Europe, 
Russia cannot even begin to do against 
us in this hemisphere.0 
UMT would also "...tend to determine a foreign policy 
which contemplates war against ilussia begun in Europe 
or Asia within the next ten years."  Conceding Thomas's 
feeling of friendship for Ilussia, he underscores another 
prevalent question:  whon was Anerica planning to fight 
with this proposed army? Ilussia was the only country 
then in a position to challenge the United States for 
world leadership in nilitary affairs and Anerica was 
vastly superior to Ilussia in technology. 
Effect upon foreign policy was not treated super- 
ficially, but was considered along with the inpact of UMT 
on American tradition.  In the first place, America led 
tbe way to the San Francisoo Conference and adoption of 
UMT would appear to reject the idea of world peace altogether 
An soon as America began to arm herself it would be only 
natural for the rest of the world to follow, if only for 
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self protection.  Of course America was a peaceful nation 
and her allies had nothing to fear, but: 
...as long as nations seek security 
in their own armed forces, they are 
doomed to total preparation for total 
war.  It is becoming clear that even 
so, they cannot attain security, be- 
cause each effort to Increase a 
nation's security thereby decreases 
the security of some other.  Total 
preparedness merely gives the hope 
of victory, it does not give the 
hope of security. 
This idea is strongly supported by the European experience, 
especially that of France, Germany, and Itussin, from lb70 
to 1914.  That period saw almost continual total preparedness 
for war and very little security.  (Even armed polico are 
occasionally attacked by unarmed thugs.)  Security then 
was not necessarily a good argument in favor of UMT. 
A significant factor in post World War II international 
relations was the presence of nuclear warfare.  The diplomacy 
of a country could be greatly influenced by its ability to 
cope with this atomic weaponry.  Many people believed that 
the traditional foreign policy of America would be drastically 
altered by the adoption of UMT.  It was argued that 
American generations, growing up under a system of universal 
military training, might react in the same manner as the 
diplomats were reacting to the atom bomb.  This latter 
innovation forced men to give it primary consideration in 
polioy formulation.  UMT would create a similar situation; 
American youth, infused with the concept or constant pre- 
paredness for war, would become militaristic in their 
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thinking.  This would result In an unduly aggressive approach 
to world problems, a very undesirable situation in view of 
the world's unsettled state.  In addition, UMT would not 
even provide a strengthened citizenry for America.  The 
Army, basically an authoritarian structure requiring 
discipline and blind obedience, was certainly not an ideal 
6 vehicle for citizenship training.   The most that could 
be gained by UMT, in this respect, would be a chance for 
many American youths to broaden their experience in inter- 
personal living.  Even this would have undesirable effects, 
according to many educators, since the Army was not designed 
to treat its members as individuals, and most Americans at 
age eighteen need some individual guidance.  To these 
observers, the long term effeots of UMT upon American life 
were not worth any additional protection which might be 
derived. 
Even though they cannot be considered expert in the 
fields of diplomacy, politics or military science the 
"moralists" could point to America's dominant position 
of power in the world.  It did not take an expert to know 
that the American Air Force and Navy were the most powerful 
in the world, and that they were the chief reasons for 
victory in World War II.  Since these two branches of the 
service were the most powerful and influential in wartime 
and, in case of surprise attack, would bear the brunt 
of defending America, it seemed reasonable to spend time 
and money to improve them.  The Navy and Air Force were 
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primarily volunteer organizations: they did not depend upon 
conscription to any great extent, and preferred to recruit 
their numbers without it.  Pointing to this and other Tacts, 
the National Council against Conscription presented a strong 
argument against UMT.  This group, organized near the end 
of World War 11, included a number of prominent and influential 
Americans.  Drawing support from such distinguished private 
citizens as Albert Einstein, William Faulkner, Harry E. 
Fosdick, Louis Bromfield, Pearl Buck, Charles S. Johnson 
(President of Fisk University), Victor Keuther, and several 
others, including many eduoators, labor leaders, and 
agricultural organizations, this faction provided strong 
organized opposition to universal military training.  The 
duration and kind of training was the key to the Council's 
opposition.  In a pamphlet released in the early 1950's 
evidence was presented showing that extensive training of 
ground combat troops was not really vital to their chances 
for survival in war.  The authors maintained that, "where 
lack of training is a factor, it is not individual training 
that is important, but training of various units to fight 
as a team."9  Quoting from the October, 1950 issue of Combat 
Forces Journal, the pamphlet emphasizes that:  -'Those who 
have had UMT would have to be retrained in the event of 
war.  Even the combat veterans of World War II would require 
retraining if they were to be used...'" 
Necessary training time for combat readiness could be 
as short as seventeen weeks according to statements by 
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military  authorities.   Furthermore,  only  11   per  cent   (1.5 
million out  of   14  Billion  inducted)   of  the  World War  II 
American  military  force   ever went  into  comhat. Since 
the  great  majority of  military  personnel  served   in  a 
"civilian"   capacity  during wartime,   it would  appear  that 
the  military  only needed  a  better  system of  classification 
for   recruits.     The  Council  argued that  even  if  time were 
needed  to  train  men  for  those  support  jobs,   that  time   could 
be   provided  by  a  small,  well-trained  professional   force. 
This  group would  be  capable  of   large  scale  retaliation 
in oase  of  an  all-out   surprise  attack   (the Air  Force's 
job   in the  atomic  age),   or  fighting  a  holding  action while 
the  entire   population was mobilized.     This   latter  function 
would  be  best   served  by a  strong Navy and  a   smaller  profes- 
sional Army based  outside  the continental  United States 
where   it  could  be more  effective at  the  outbreak  of a  war. 
This  basic  plan was  the   forerunner  of  the   1952-60 
llepublioan Administration's  defense  proposals.     "Mor« 
bang  for  the  buck"  was  the   theory  followed   in  the  mid-1950's, 
and  one   result  was American  unpreparedness   for  the   1960's 
Viet   Nam  conflict.     The  moralists were  not  alone   in over- 
looking  the   impact   of  guerrilla  warfare;   almost  everyone 
after   World War  II was  concerned with  a   large   scale  conflict, 
not  brush-fire wars.     All America wanted  to  he  ready   if and 
when  the  next  big war  began.    Robert M.   Hutohins,  President 
of   the  University  of Chicago,  was  not  against   national  defense, 
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but he wanted people to understand this basic point: "The 
argument that our military experts insist upon is that 
peacetime conscription gives a country a head start in 
military encounters with other nations.  What kind of 
country is it that wants a headstart?"   This was the 
primary consideration of the moralists, if America were 
to be fully prepared for war, it would no longer be America. 
B.  Education and Labor Opinions 
One of the sources of America's great strength is 
technological advance.  This ability to advance is founded 
upon a system of universal education and the desire 
constantly to improve the mechanical artifacts of our 
culture.  nightly or wrongly, America seems to be possessed 
by the urge for bigger and better things, especially in 
production of goods.  To achieve this goal it is necessary 
for the youth of the country to receive more and better 
technical (scientific and mechanical) training at an earlier 
age.  This situation is in direct conflict with any system 
of universal military training.  The ideal age for a soldier 
is lb-20 years, the time when most American males are either 
entering upon their advanced education or beginning to learn 
a trade by working full time.  According to many educators, 
the loss of six months, or one or two years at this stage 
would be critical.  The loss of time would, of course, be 
influential in the decisions and educational development 
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of many.  College plans might be shattered, and job oppor- 
tunities lost because of forced military service.  Even 
though a UMT system would theoretically affect all males 
of that age range, there would be many who would not serve 
because of physical defects (not necessarily serious but 
enough to preclude military service), and they would 
benefit from their peers' loss of time. 
The loss-of-time argument, while substantially 
valid, was weakened somewhat by a counter-affirmation. 
To be sure, many individuals' plans would be disrupted, 
but an unknown number, aided by one or two years of thought, 
exposure to life, and maturity, would be altered for the 
good of the individual, and the country.  While in the 
Armed Forces, it would be possible for an individual to 
obtain basic technical training for a civilian occupation. 
It would also be possible to further one's education even 
while serving in the Armed Forces; an individual with the 
desire for knowledge or training could receive it just as 
well from the Army.  Robert J. Havighurst, University of 
Chicago Frofessor of Education, did not agree. 
The thing would happen that always 
happens when a society of men only 
is created by putting all kinds of 
men together at random and placing 
them under the authority of other 
■en who have no interest in, or 
preparation for, the tasks of in- 
tellectual and moral education: the 
lowest common denominator of in- 
tellectual cultural, and moral life 
would prevail.13 
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This idea was also expressed by the editors of the National 
Education Association Journal and reiterated by many other 
14 
prominent educators. 
Bffect upon higher education would be difficult to 
measure, but enrollment figures were offered as an indication 
of the impact of compulsory military service.  An article 
by the New York Times education writer, Benjamin Fine, 
cited a decrease in the number of graduate students in the 
1951-52 and 1952-53 school years.  The decline from 11,300 
in the former period to fe.OOO in the latter was attributed 
to local draft board's classification of those students as 
1-A and their subsequent selection for military service 
prior to completing their studies.15  The implication is 
not only that these students would have benefited more 
by completion of their graduate work but that the country 
would benefit also.  Implied, too, is the possibility 
that many of these students, interrupted as they were, 
would not continue their advanced studies upon completion 
of military service. 
Educators argued that the military influence could 
so alter the conscript's way of life that academic initiative 
would be weakened drastically.  This possibility would 
influence the post-military attitude toward education and 
its chief purpose, intellectual stimulation.  Coming a. 
it would, between high school and college, UMT would create 
an air of docile, obedient scholars, willing to obey, 
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rather than question, their teachers.  This potential effect 
is dramatically illustrated by the following opinion of 
August 11. Hollingshead: 
The perfectly trained soldier is one who 
has had his civilian initiative reduced 
to zero.  In the process the self be- 
comes identified with the Institution 
and dependent upon it for direction and 
stimulation.  The ideally adjusted soldier 
would be a military dependent who looked 
to the institution for all his personal, 
social, and emotional satisfactions. 
Unlike the dependent child, who normally 
matures and strives to break the bonds 
of dependency that tie him to his parents, 
the adjusted soldier is encouraged to be 
a dependent of the institution.  In 
phychintric terms, the military institution 
becomes a substitute parent for an adult 
who has been reduced to infancy by the 
training it has given him.16 
Outside observers have often remarked that it is surprising 
to note how many adult "children" there are in the Armed 
Forces.  There is a tendency amou;_. career soldiers, once 
their promotional peak is achieved, to adopt an attitude 
of semi-retirement, merely awaiting the day that retire- 
ment becomes official.  This situation is found primarily 
in the administrative branch of the Armed Forces, but 
this branch tends to be the aost influential when ohanges 
are considered.  These individuals are described by 
Hollingshead as, 
...men conditioned  to   institutional 
requirements,   define? situations, 
and  explicit   expectancies who will 
neither   think  for   themselves   nor   make 
demands  on the   institution lor  needs 
that   are   noTTdTntlfled witFTnstitu- 
tionaT"c"n<:s.     (sic). . .For  these   reasons 
the recruit  must   be remade;   as any old 
sergeant   knows,   'a recruit   is  not l7 
worth a  damn until  he  has  been broken.1 
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Commenting   on Uollingshcad's   statement,   the  National   Council 
Against  Conscription observed   that:   "If   this   is  not   disruptive 
to   'human  plans',   'normal   living  habits'   and  individual 
dignity,   the  word disruptive  has   lost   its  meaning."16 
A   third,   seemingly  valid,  argument  against  UMT on 
the  grounds   that   it  unnecessarily   interrupted  the  educational 
process was   presented  by  Charles W.  Cole,   President  of 
Amherst   College.     Writing  in  LOOK  magazine,  Cole   pointed 
out   that  the  United States  could  not  possibly  match Uussian 
or  Chinese  manpower.     The  answer  to  defense  problems  there- 
fore   lay   in vastly  superior  technology,     education anil 
research were  the   paths  to  this   front-rank  position.     In 
the   initial   phase  of any  UMT   program America  would  create 
a  gap   in  the  development  of  her  future   scientists   and 
engineers  which  could  prove   fatal.     Any   period   of  UMT 
could   not   hope  to  match  the  comparable   period   of  civilian 
training  thus  creating  the  gap.     Although  concediug compul- 
sory  military service  to be  a  necessity,   he was  against 
any  program  to  universalize  such  service.     To  strengthen 
his  argument,  Cole  reminded  readers  that  the  winners  of 
World  War   II,  America  and Great  Britain,  were  the  only 
major   powers without  a  universal  military system  prior  to 
the  war.19     Though  his  position seemed   to  some  readers  to 
have  about   it   the  odor  of   intellectual   snobbishness,   Cole 
presented   this   interesting and  provocative  observation: 
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Almost all great scientific discoveries, 
basic new ideas, from those of Newton to 
Einstein, have been developed by very 
illy unii« 30. oft« 
*v 
young men, i. 
under 25...Today, science is so complex 
that it takes five or ten years after 
high school to get out to the scientific 
frontiers where advances can be made. 
To add two years to the time required 
to get to the point where such contributions 
are possible might slow our scientific 
progress..,ao 
It is evident that widespread concern about the damage to 
education and progress which might result from a system 
of UMT was not without a substantial basis for fear. 
This fear was not the sole concern of educators; 
organized labor also saw in UMT a threat to the continued 
expansion of the American economy.  Every major labor organi- 
zation was against the idea of universal military service. 
Labor leaders preferred that the country's educational 
establishment rather than the Army train industry's future 
leaders and employees.  Their reasons were many and varied 
but they basically echoed those of the moralists and educators 
Labor felt that the United States' industrial strength and 
capacity for change was its greatest asset.  To deny industry 
the opportunity to develop fully was criminal, and a period 
of UMT would create a gap in industrial growth.  Further- 
more, this gap would come at a time when American industry 
was beginning to recover fully from the effeots of the 
Depression.  Industry had proven its capability to produce 
vast quantities of war material, so there was no need to 
worry about its ability to provide the equipment if war 
came again. 21 
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Labor leaders were also concerned with the effects of 
regimentation on American youth.  Perhaps their concern lay 
not in the necessary discipline which the army required, 
and which industry also requires, but in the possible anti- 
labor attitudes which this Amy service night engender. 
Military leaders were an influential section of the conserva- 
tive opposition to labor's attenpts to organize and to 
improve the condition of the working man.  Forced military 
service at an early age could easily result in an unfavorable 
attitude toward organized labor.  This attitude would be a 
result of the military's indoctrination which demanded 
obedience to one's superiors.  Labor's fear, not openly 
expressed, but implied in arguments against the undemocratic 
structure of the military, are not to be considered lightly. 
It is entirely possible that UMT would result in a gradual 
shift of support from organized labor to the more conserva- 
tive elements in America.  After all, the loudest proponents 
of UMT were basically conservative in outlook, conceiving 
such a program to be primarily for protection. 
The fears expressed by educators and labor leaders 
were based primarily upon moral, economic, and intellectual 
arguments.  Soundly presented and containing substantial 
validity, they appealed to the educated and liberal elements 
of American society.  To the "man in the street" many of 
these arguments were not convincing.  He was concerned 
principally with keeping America safe and strong.  Turning 
now to the expert opinions offered, we find that every 
issue has two sides, and even three or more. 
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C.  The Civilian Experts 
Even though the polls reflected approval of UMT by 
the aan la the street, many experienced voices belittled 
the value of such a program.  Among the most highly informed 
and outspoken critics of UMT were Hanson V. Baldwin, New 
York Times military editor, and Josephus Daniels, former 
Secretary of the Navy and editor of the Raleigh (N. C.) 
News and Observer.  Both men based their opposition on 
technological aspects of modern warfare.  Air power, 
especially nuclear air power, was the key to future security. 
As long as the United States had the capacity to wage total 
atomic war throughout the world, she need not fear sudden 
attack.  As Daniels put it:  "The outstanding lesson taught 
by World War II is that the nation whioh commands the air 
is the nation that can rule the world."22  He went on to 
say that peacetime conscription was certainly not needed 
for the Air Force since it was rapidly filling its ranks 
23 with volunteers. 
Hanson Baldwin presented a plan of defense for the 
United States which totally eliminated the need for a large 
peacetime Army.  Baldwin based his plan upon geography and 
technology:  "...our geographical position is still our 
greatest defensive asset...No great land army is needed 
for the defense of the continental United States, at least 
not in the initial year of war."2* America's military 
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commitments were not confined to the continental United 
States, and Baldwin realized and approved the postwar shift 
towards world responsibility.  These commitments could best 
be upheld, "by small but well equipped and highly trained 
land garrisons and small amphibious forces."25  The large 
army would be needed to conolude successfully any conflict, 
but the outlying bases would provide enough tine to train 
and equip a mass army.    This plan, or course, is also 
one of the basic tenets of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation, the idea that American forces are in Europe primarily 
to fight a delaying action until mass mobilization can be 
effected. 
Delving further into Baldwin's proposal, one finds an 
almost irreconcilable dilemma.  He argues, rightly, that 
America has, in her veterans, enough trained men for the 
near future.  Furthermore, the distant future will be 
radically altered by technological advances so that it is 
really impossible to plan for it.  The United States can 
only be attacked by air or sea and as long as she controls 
both there can be no surprise attack.  This control would 
also be necessary before any large army could be transported 
overseas, therefore it is vital irrespective of the army's 
size.  A future war will be characterized by reliance 
upon airpower in the initial stages and will develop into 
total conflict based upon the accomplishments of airpower. 
One of three results will probably occur:  a stalemate, 
giving the United States enough time to gather a mass army; 
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United States superiority, aiso granting time; or, total 
nuclear war, in which case the airplanes will be the only 
participants.  Along these lines, Baldwin felt that the 
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only true defense was retaliatory capability.    To 
prevent attack it was imperative that one maintain the 
ability totally to destroy any and all aggressors. 
Apparently conflicting with this approach was Baldwin's 
further disparagement of the need for UMT to provide a 
world wide "police" foroe.  The United Nations was not 
really based upon enforcement of its policies, although 
enforcement action would be necessary at times.  Rather, 
it depended "...upon the agreements, political, economic, 
and military, arrived at among the three great powers 
Of, 
outside the framework of Dumbarton Oaks." °     Unable to 
match Russian manpower, the United States was forced to 
depend upon technology as a means of negotiating with 
Russia.  This concept was carried further by the statements 
of Urayson Kirk, at that time Columbia University Associate 
Professor of Government.  Kirk maintained that national 
defense was a matter of concern only in two situations; 
if America's present enemies (Germany and Japan) were to 
regain their military strength, or in case of a disagree- 
ment with current allies.  The former instance could be 
prevented by good leadership and an adequate air force and 
navy.  In regard to the latter possibility, he presented 
two basic arguments against UMT:  (l) it would foster isolationist 
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by strengthening the idea that another war was inevitable, 
and (2) such an idea would encourage regionalism (especially 
Western hemispheric defense planning) and eliminate the 
29 worldwide influence of the United Nations. 
Professor Kirk offered his thoughts on the policies 
which America should follow.  Considering the alternative 
to his plan (war, and probably nuolear war), students of 
the issue felt that one must weigh carefully the concept 
presented by Kirk.  Although it has been advanced throughout 
the history of mankind as the only true solution to inter- 
national conflict, it bears repeating.  To Kirk, 
...the fundamentals of our future security 
are essentially political rather than 
military.  Skillful statesmanship, supported 
by a reasonably strong force in being and 
backed by the immense military potential 
of the United States, gives us the maximum 
likelihood of future security.  For this 
combination the strongest standing military  30 
force alone is not a satisfactory substitute. 
This idea worked for Great Britain in the Nineteenth Century 
and resulted in the Pax Brlttanica.  This idea has also 
been abused by German  and France in the Twentieth Century, 
one of the results being World War I.  It is an ideal, but 
in this day and time of nuclear weaponry, many have pointed 
out that it is also the only practical solution. 
The beat statesmen in the world could not "negotiate" 
one simple fact, the size and significance of a Universal 
Military Training program in America.  Regardless of the 
United States' intentions, the adoption of UMT following 
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World War II would be viewed primarily as an announcement 
of defeat because no one really knew yet whether military 
strength would be the key factor in postwar international 
relations.  Certainly an effort to solve world problems 
without resorting to force should be made.  Adoption of 
UMT would indicate that America was not serious about 
collective security and the United Nations, and would create 
fear because, "The only other great armed nations remaining 
are Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—our allies 
31 who have vowed with us to establish collective security." 
Great nations were not saved by UMT and smaller ones 
were defeated in spite of it.  With its poor record of 
success since lfaOO, UMT was not considered effective. 
Senator liobert A. Taft (R., Ohio) believed that UMT might 
help if another world war occurred, but organization would 
still require as much time.  The best solution was to improve 
the condition and effectiveness of volunteers in order to 
create a smaller, well-trained, and efficient armed forces. 
In addition, Taft said that American adoption of UMT would 
greatly influence the world attitude toward militarism by 
making it more attractive to other nations.32  In agreement 
with Taft's viewpoint was an earlier observation by the Dean 
of Lehigh University's College of Business Administration, 
Neil Carothers.  Mr. Carothers argued: 
The truth ia that  .rs are fought by the 
current generation after brief training 
in the operation of the latest scientific 
equipment.  And they are won by superiority 
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of equipment, industrial resources and 
manpower...There is no way to 'prepare' 
a nation for modern war except to keep 
the entire manpower constantly in uniform, 
with the latest equipment.33 
This point of view has been proven by experiences ranging 
from those of militiamen in frontier America through those 
of the Vermacht of Adolph Hitler.  Most observers agreed 
that oonstant preparedness was the only true defense, but 
the United States oould not afford to keep everyone in 
uniform constantly.  It was necessary to achieve another, 
equally effective, solution to the problem. 
Much of the experts' argument against UMT was not 
"anti-defense".  The major point of conflict centered upon 
the best means for achieving national defense.  Vast man- 
power reserves were no longer necessary according to many. 
One opponent of UMT put it this way: 
In an era when a nation's power and 
weight in world affairs are measured, 
not primarily by the number of its 
potential soldiers, but by the size 
of its heavy industry, the United 
States will hold a military advantage 
out of all proportion of its popula- 
tion.34 
This unique situation, created by World War II developments, 
gave the key to industry and research.  No longer was it 
mandatory that a highly developed industrial nation maintain 
a large army or reserve strength solely in terms of manpower. 
Today the weapon carries the soldier... 
Without such equipment an army is helpless, 
no matter how brave, well trained, and 
numerous its soldiers may be...Generalship...  35 
has become a problem in industrial engineering. 
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The idea then was to rely upon American industrial strength to 
maintain so much technological superiority that manpower needs 
could be minimized.  This idea did not apply solely in 
the realm of defense as the computer and other machines 
began to affect the civilian occupations as well. 
Opposition to UMT in the 1945-50 period was perhaps 
based upon sound and valid premises.  No one really knew 
what the world would be like in ten or twenty years, but 
all indications were that change would be rapid and wide- 
spread.  Technology was advancing so fast that many new 
developments were outmoded almost overnight.  It was 
ridiculous to assert that the answer to America's defense 
needs could be a concept taken from the past and reintro- 
duced.  The United States did not need old ideas which 
had not proven themselves before; she needed a now approach. 
Sound foreign policy, industry, technology, and, above all 
else, quality rather than mere quantity.  The way to peace, 
or at least worldwide stabilization, was not universal 
conscription, but universal progress. 
CONGilESS:  THE TRUE TEST 
Congress, of course, holds the key to legislation. 
The Supreme Court can interpret law and the President 
influences the administration of the law, but only Congress 
can formalize a concept such as Universal Military Training. 
uiie of the significant aspects of the UMT debate was not 
Congress's opinion, but rather its lack of opinion.  There 
was no clearcut expression either of favor or disfavor 
by that body.  Individuals fought for or against the proposal 
with great vigor and along the same lines as those that 
marked the popular debate.  Several committees held hearings 
and heard the same arguments and opinions which the general 
public heard.1  The end result was several volumes of testi- 
mony and no official pronouncements.  Although four separate 
committees in three years investigated the question of UMT, 
no group opinion was ever given. 
There was no lack of individual opinion.  Seldom 
expressed in floor debate or committee hearings, it was 
evidenced by agreement'with others' expressed opinions. 
This concurrence frequently took the form of articles 
reprinted in the Congressional ltecord at the request of a 
Senator or Representative.  Usually based upon emotion 
or intention to persuade rather than upon specific facts, 
these articles reflect in a general way the attitudes of 
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the press and local veterans and civic organizations.  The 
majority of the material reflects opposition to UMT and 
much was put forth during the latter half of 1945, immediately 
after the nation's victory in war.  This singular fact 
must be remembered when these arguments are perused, for it 
exerted a direct influence upon the reasoning involved. 
A natural first reaction to the proposals for UMT was 
based upon the impact of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Uepresenta- 
tive Louis Ludlow of Indiana was against Universal Military 
Training because, said he: 
...it is plain that the wars of the future, 
should there be any, will be decided by 
these amazing and horrifying inventions... 
Competition in military armament simply 
must not be allowed to happen, for 
another war...would mean the mass 
destruction of the life of our planet 
and the complete annihilation of civi- 
lization.2 
Carrying this line of thinking even further Senator Clyde 
Hoey (D., N. C.) felt that the military was old-fashioned 
in its thinking, relying upon an idea that history had 
proved obsolete and unworkable: 
In advocating universal military 
training, the military leaders are 
following the same out-moded policy 
that they followed after the last 
war when they clamored for big 
battleships and large armies and 
refused to build airplanes and adopt  3 
modern weapons and methods of defense. 
Representative Emanuel Celler (D., N. Y.) also employed this 
argument and advocated a purely volunteer professional army 
to utilize Amerioan technology. 
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In  conjunction with  arguments  on  technological  and 
democratic  grounds,   there  was   strong  opposition constructed 
upon foreign  policy  considerations.     One  of   the chief  pro- 
UMT  points  was   the  need  for  protection   in  the   postwar world. 
Since  technology  shortened  the  time  for   preparation and 
response   it  was  vitally necessary  to be  constantly ready  to 
mobilize.     This  concept was   strengthened  by  the American 
withdrawal   from world   involvement   following World  War  I. 
An Indianapolis,   Indiana,   editor  and   publisher,   Eugene  C. 
Pulliam,   did  not  agree with this  view and itepresentative 
Ludlow  concurred   in the  opposition.     Said  Pulliam: 
After  this war  the American  people  are 
not  going  to  become  apathetic.     The  war, 
the  peace,   the   threats  to  our  security, 
our  economic  survival  will   keep the 
American  people  vitally  concerned  for 
years   to come.     We  couldn't  be apathetic 
if  we  wanted   to  be.     We  will  be   living 
in a world  of  social  and  political  chaos, 
and  apathy—as  far  as  national   defense 
is  concerned—will  be  out  the  window. 
What  they  seemed  to   imply was  that  UMT would  tend  to  make   the 
people  apathetic  by  presenting a  false  sense of  security. 
(Others  were  quick to  point  out   that  this  was  exactly what 
the  U.   N.   did,  without  UMT.)     This   idea was  also  expressed 
by an organization  of  veterans,   the Military Order of  the 
Liberty Dell,   comprised  of  ex-servicemen.     It was  opposed 
to UMT  for  the  reason  that  the  further  the  country got  from 
war  or  thoughts  of war,   the  more  likely   it would  be  that 
people would  decide  that  a  system based  on UMT was  too 
costly and   ineffective  and  the  -ore   likely  they would  be  to 
repeal   it,   thereby destroying America's  defense  system. 
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Foreign policy and military policy should be directed 
towards world unity, not destruction: so ran the argument. 
Most important, foreign policy should control and must be 
formulated prior to the adoption of any military plans. 
Joseph Martin, oalling for world disarmament, warned: 
Remember, the very least we can achieve... 
is to find out where the other world powers 
stand and how sincere is their desire for 
peace.  Either the governments of the world 
want peace and do not need the regiments 
and the hardware of war, or we must conclude 
they want hugh armaments because they expect 
to use them.  In either event, now is the 
time to find out.6 
This idea seemed to many to represent the best general concept 
of government in regard to vital issues "Make haste slowly". 
It was not an isolated opinion; it reflected the oore of 
"liberal" thinking on the topic of defense in general and 
UMT in particular.  As previously noted, Congressional 
division on UMT was not partisan; the basic issue was con- 
servative versus liberal and the latter were undoubtedly 
more coherent.  Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota 
endorsed the viewpoint that American adoption of UMT would 
only generate a rapidly escalating worldwide armaments raoe. 
This race would result in only one thing, another war in 
which no victor could emerge.  It would be far better to 
depend on collective security, enforced by the United Nations, 
than to initiate anew the old tactic of "every man for him- 
self and the Devil take the hindmost".  Immediately after 
World War II was the ideal time for a new approach to inter- 
ns tional relations and it must be taken. 
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5b 
The focus of liberal thought on UMT as an unnecessary 
and damaging factor in foreign policy was upon world opinion. 
According to J. H. Scattergood, of the Friends Committee on 
National Legislation, the issue was not preparation for war 
but prevention of war. 
The old military preparedness way is 
based on the theory that each nation 
must be stronger than any other, either 
in its own strength alone or with others 
to give it the advantage in the balance 
of power.  We know by bitter experience... 
that this theory has not worked... it 
has started more wars than it has stopped... 
it is based on a psychology of war, that 
instead of there being safety in this 
policy of military preparedness, there 
is almost certain danger of a third 
world war.10 
This goes straight to the basis of the pro-UMT arguments, 
necessity for protection.  If Amerioa is to be safe, she 
must be stronger than any other single nation or combination 
of countries.  A logical result, according to the liberals, 
would be another arms race.  That this would be inescapable 
if the United States adopted a strong military policy, 
based upon UMT, was shown by the highly respected Norman 
Thomas, the nation's most famous Socialist leader, in a 
statement before the House Select Committee on l'ostwar 
Military Policy, Thomas expressed himself in these words: 
There is no suoh thing as shaping a 
military policy in a vacuum or as a 
thing in itself.  Clausewitz and other 
theorists in the arts of war were en- 
tirely right in arguing that war is 
the extension of diplomacy or of the 
foreign policy of nations.  No matter 
how sinoere advocates of conscription 
or any other military policy for the 
United States may be in claiming that 
they are not thinking of particular 
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potential enemies but are merely advo- 
cating a general policy of insurance 
against war, nothing of the sort is 
possible.  No nation has ever practiced 
conscription and competitive militarism 
except with a view to specific potential 
enemies...Other nations assume, as a matter 
of course, that a competitive military 
policy is an expression of a competitive   . 
imperialistic policy and act accordingly... 
Perhaps history tends to support this idea, Tor, even in 
the lQGO's, the spectre of imperialism is raised by all 
parties to a conflict.  Communism belabors the "capitalistic 
imperialism" of America, and the United States fights 
the "imperialistic encroachment" of Communist China. 
There arc a great number of "imperialistic" attitudes in 
Viet Nam, on both sides. 
Another significant argument against UMT was advanced 
by Representative Albert Engel of Michigan, Chairman of the 
War Department subcommittee of the House Appropriations 
Committee, Engel felt that "...compulsory peacetime universal 
military conscription will not only fail to give us adequate 
national defense but will be a detriment rather than a help 
to national defense."12 According to Ungel the basic need 
of America was force in readiness to meet an attack.  This 
force could not be maintained by UMT.  A strong regular 
Army, manned by Selective Service if necessary, was the only 
solution.  Citing the experience of the Army Air Corps in 
World War II, Engel agrees with General H. H. ("Hap") Arnold 
that, "'You oan, however, train personnel faster than you 
can build equipment...back of everything must be production; 
60 
the personnel is normally ahead of the equipment.'"13  The 
only solution was to rely on technology, production, and 
volunteers Tor the core of United States defense, supplemented 
by Selective Servioe if needed.  In no case should dependence 
upon UMT be considered, the world was beyond that point. 
*#«*«#**     # 
Favorable Congressional reaction to UMT depended upon 
two basic propositions.  First, it would be necessary to 
maintain American defenses against possible attack and, second, 
the only way to maintain the Armed Forces strength was by 
the adoption of universal military training.  As previously 
mentioned, the basic argument was the necessity of UMT as 
insurance in case of future involvement in war.    This was 
the primary viewpoint underlying the arguments of the UMT 
advocates.  It had happened before and it was certain to 
happen again unless the United States made a positive, firm 
effort to prevent it.  Using 0ormany and Japan as examples, 
proponents of UMT attempted to show that it would be effective. 
Two Louisiana ilepresentatives, Uenry Larcade, Jr. and Overton 
Brooks, quoted administration personnel to support the 
deterrent potential of UMT. 
Let us remember that bullies do not attack 
the strong; they attack the weak.  Let us 
remember the boasts of Hitler and Goering 
and iiibbentrop that Germany would bring 
England to her knees in short order, because 
England bad allowed her military strength 
to disintegrate...The Japanese boasted 
that the United States, being militarily 
weak, could never survive the knockout 
blow that was to be given at Pearl Harbor... 
If another war comes, potential strength 
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and bull-dog tenacity and aoral staying 
power nay not mean very much.  Unless 
we are militarily prepared to act immediately, 
the play nay be over before the curtain is 
half up.15 
Deterrence could only be accomplished by constant preparedness. 
Germany's attitude in 1939 was again cited as an example of 
the need for readiness.  In a statement before the House 
Armed Services Committee, James Forrestal, Secretary of 
Defense, referred to that attitude. 
Finding himself unchecked, except by the 
efforts of appeasement at Munich, Hitler 
grew convinced that the Western democracies 
were without courage and without the will 
to remain free.  On August 22, 1939, he 
told hla commanders in chief; 'We have 
nothing to lose; we can only gain.... 
Our enemies are little worms...I saw 
them in Munich!'  Nine days later the    16 
Nazis marched in open war against Poland. 
Short-term protection against another such occurrence could 
be secured by Selective Service and the veterans of World 
War II; long-term protection could only be obtained with 
UMT or an enormous standing army.  Forrestal commented 
that, " not in our lifetime or in that of the next 
generation do I foresee the time when a strong military 
potential will not be needed to back up our diplomacy. 
The primary concern was that of maintaining a posture of 
readiness as a deterrent to any future aggressor. 
The secondary consideration was the mesns of attaining 
and maintaining readiness.  Technology was one answer, but 
warfare with machines alone is not yet possible.  Manpower 
is still a vital element and was especially so in the 
,.17 
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1940's.      In  comparison  with   the   approximately   eight   million 
individuals   in  uniform   in  1945  the   postwar Military establish- 
ment was  quite  small,   fewer  than one  Million   in  the Army  and 
Air Force   combined.     The  authorized  combined  strength  in 
1947  was   926,638   (591,000 ArMy;   335,638 Air Force),   but 
the  actual  strength was  764,330   (49b,974 Army;   2b5,356 
Air  Force).     Both  services  stood at  about  b5   per  cent 
of  their  authorized  strength.     The Air Force  relied  ex- 
clusively  on  volunteers  and  was   no  closer  to  full   strength 
than  the  Army.     Itecruiting  figures  for SepteMber,   October, 
and   November,   1947   show   that   almost   equal   numbers   were 
entering  each  branch.     A  Monthly  enlistment  figure  of  about 
9,000  or   10,000 was  Maintained.     This  figure was  adequate 
for  the Air Force  but  represented  only  one-half  of  the 
Army's  required  numbers. It   was  fairly  obvious  to aany 
observers   that   Lewis  Hershey was  correct   in  his   judgment 
that,   "The  experience  of   this Nation   Indicates  that when 
relatively  large   numbers  are  needed   in the  armed   forces 
some  form  of   compulsion  must  be   provided." 
Congressional   opinion was  not  as  definite  on  the 
subject  of  universal   military  training as was  private 
opinion.     For  the  most   part,   Congressmen  and Senators  merely 
indicated  or  hinted  at   support   of  popular  statements  by 
proponents  and opponents  of  UMT,   rather   than make   forthright 
declarations   of  their  own.     This   lack of   official   expression 
contributed  to the   ultimate   failure  of  UMT advocates  to  push 
their   program  through  Congress.     The  baaic  conflict   never 
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achieved  the   proportions   of  a  direot   confrontation  of  the 
two  political   parties;   the   issue  was   primarily,   if  loosely, 
liberal   versus   conservation with   little  regard  to  partisan 
distinctions.     Whether  this  resulted   in a   victory  for  the 
American  people  or  a  dangerous  delay  can  only  be  determined 
by an examination  of  the  battle's  results. 
THE RESULTS 
Controversy over the adoption of a universal military- 
training program reached a climax in 1947 and 194b.  The 
results of a study by Thomas K. Finletter in late 1947 
supported the concept of total war by airpower.  According 
to this report, the Air Force, because of its retaliatory 
capabilities, was the primary means of defense and should 
be greatly expanded.  When this Impressive report was 
added to the objections previously voiced by liberal groups, 
the result was the virtual death of UMT.   Forrestal, 
Secretary of Defense, now had to balance the demands of 
the Army and the Air Force.  In order to achieve stability 
and harmony it was necessary to retreat in both issues. 
As a result, the Air Force was expanded slightly and UMT 
was sacrificed for Selective Service.  Although neither 
group was entirely satisfied, the compromise appeared 
suited 
...to the pressing immediate need, which 
was for some readily available forces, 
not to fight a possible future third 
world war but to deal on the ground at 
that tine with the 'various potentially 
explosive areas1, as Forrestal put it, 
out of which alone the danger of a future 
world war could come.2 
The idea of containment, small-scale opposition throughout 
the world's trouble areas, appeared more sensible and less 
costly than continual, complete preparation for World War III. 
65 
UMT was not completely forgotten after 194fc; in fact, 
it is still advanced in the 1960's as a solution to problems 
of American military policy.  Less than two years after the 
compromise which removed UMT from the Army's necessary list 
it appeared that a drastic mistake had been made.  The out- 
break of the Korean conflict in June, 1950, pointed out the 
need for a readily available, trained reserve of manpower. 
The United States did not have it.  Representative James 
Wadsworth of New York oriticized this situation in the 
rol lowing, way: 
Now, we have relied up to this point... 
upon the volunteer system to maintain 
the reserve, and it has failed.  Make 
no mistake about it, it has failed. 
Our iieserve strength ought to be three 
or four times the strength of our first- 
line forces.  And it should be a well- 
trained Reserve.** 
The Reserves' strength was pitifully inadequate for the 
purpose of supporting the Regular forces.  Manpower in the 
Reserves was 520,000 in the Army (250,000 in an active 
training status), 1,103,000 Navy (204,000 in active training), 
and 354,000 Air Force (only 6fc,000 receiving active training). 
In addition, the regular forces were greatly undermanned. 
Budget-appropriated strength, probably greater than actual 
strength, was much lower than Congressionally authorized 
aaxlmuma.  The Army was at 75 per cent full strength 
(620,000 of b37,000), the Navy, 69 per cent (461,000 of 
666,bb2), and the Air Force at 63 per cent (416,000 of 
502,000) of authorized full-strength.4 
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What   a  difference   it would  have  made   it  UMT had been 
adopted,   the critics  exclaimed.    As tfadsworth  put   it: 
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This  attitude was   shared  by Senators Tydings   (Md.), 
Thye   (Minn.),  and  Lodge   (Mass.).     The  former  characterized 
the American military dilemma   in   1950  in this way: 
Strange   and  paradoxical   as   it may seem, 
this  nation is   prepared   primarily to 
fight a  major   power a  nation of 
big cities,   of  great  expanse...a  nation 
that   lives more  or less   on  level  ground. 
It   is  not  prepared for guerrilla warfare 
6,000 or 7,000 miles from home.6 
It  would  appear  that   the United States military  leaders 
learned absolutely nothing from the   1947-b experience   in 
Greece and  Palestine.     Obviously   these  guerrilla actions 
had more   influence  on Far Eastern military thought   than 
American.     Senator Tydings gives  an explanation for  such an 
oversight  by America's  military. 
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Dependence upon one primary defense system was a definite 
handicap in Korea; the future would certainly need to see 
this situation altered. 
Hindsight observers soon emphasized that Korea had 
brought out a glaring failure in the current reserve organi- 
zation.  First called were the World War II veterans, not 
the more recently trained reservists.  The theory was that 
these men would require only physical training and, because 
of their previous combat experience, be more effective than 
trained but untested troops.  True, perhaps, but eminently 
unfair, in the opinions of many.  Senator Lodge proposed 
the immediate adoption of a universal military service 
program "under which every able-bodied man would serve for 
a period of lb months", as a means of equalizing the burden 
of service.b  This was also necessary because, 
We are faltering and are failing to put 
our manpower into the military service 
in significant numbers—which would provide 
the sole reliable basis upon which peace 
can be built and without which we could 
not win the war if, in spite of our efforts, 
it should come.  We must have more oombat 
units and that takes manpower. 
Lodge admitted that UMT would do disservice to the American 
cause in Korea, because it would require too many valuable 
Regular troops for training purposes.  In the long run, 
however, "It would give us the best civilian peacetime reserve 
we have ever had in all our history."10 
Evidence suggests that UMT would have contributed very 
little to the American efforts in Korea.  After the initial 
6b 
shock of attack, United States troops based io Japan were 
rushed to the peninsula.  Ureatly uoder strength, poorly 
equipped and ill-trained, these troops, under the leadership 
of General Douglas McArthur, drove the North Korean Army 
out of its own hone territory by the end of 1950.  This 
seemed to prove rather conclusively that the peacetime army 
was capable of fighting a guerrilla action far from the 
United States.  Then, in December, 1950, disaster struck in 
the form of the Hed Chinese Regular Army.  Calling themselves 
volunteers of the North Korean Peoples' iiepublic, this 
well-trained and sizable force almost pushed the United 
Nations troops (primarily American forces) out of Korea 
completely by the Spring of 1951.  To the casual observer 
this drastic situation emphasized the failure of Congress 
to adopt UMT in 1947—as it was certainly needed in 1951. 
This was not the true picture; UMT would have made little 
if any difference in the progression of the Korean conflict. 
Korea proved only that the peacetime American Army was not 
capable of matching the manpower of the Hed Chinese regular 
army, a fact that had been conceded by almost everyone.  The 
United States decisions not to attack the Chinese mainland 
or employ atonic weapons in Korea were the significant 
military effects of this conflict.  These decisions were 
based more upon the anticipated reaction of world opinion 
than upon pure military strategy.  Strategically, the full 
utilization of American airpower would have wrought havoc 
In China; the end result would probably have been World War III 
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Again the paradoxical dilemma raised itself.  The only 
way that America had of defending herself against World 
..'ar III was to start it.  Ueliance upon airpower and nuclear 
weapons for defense meant that they were also the only avail- 
able weapons for offense.  When a sustained offensive effort 
became necessary in Korea, America was forced to fight with 
its outmoded weapons from World War Il's inventories.  Un- 
fortunately, from a developmental standpoint, the Korean 
episode did not last long enough (nor was there much danger 
of losing after that disastrous Spring of 1951) for effective, 
new weapons to be designed and tested for that type of 
warfare.  The United States continued to rely upon the 
concept of total retaliatory warfare especially since 
Uussia now had the Bomb, and was working on a missile to 
deliver it. 
The remaining years of the 1950's saw fantastic develop- 
ments in nuclear weaponry and delivery systems.  By 1960 it 
was evident that any world conflict would indeed result in 
almost total destruction for all concerned.  The Cuban Missile 
Crisis in October, 1962, showed the real fear which this 
situation was capable of creating.  This fear was not so 
much a fear of death .per se as it was a fear of failure. 
If the mid-Twentieth century wore to witness a nuclear world 
war it would prove that democracy was an unworkable system 
of government.  It would confirm the past experiences of 
other democracies that physical survival is not possible 
without an unacceptable political and philosophical reorienta- 
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tion.  This possibility is still present, evidenced by the 
spread of a "Itight-wing backlash" in current domestic politics 
on the state and local levels of government. 
There is evidence also of a reevaluation in the area 
of the country's foreign policy.  American experience since 
1945, especially in Korea and Viet Nam as well as in the 
world at large, emphasizes that this country has a basic 
need for diplomats and statesmen.  As Admiral William 
("Dull") Halsey expressed it in 1945: 
...the need for wise, trained men to administer 
the national policy.  We need men who under- 
stand the causes of war and conflict, who 
understand the fundamentals of our aims and 
ideals, who understand the interrelation of 
international policies, trade, and finance 
and the true significance of military 
power. 11 
The be6t nuclear missile defense system in the world is 
useless without such men to decide when, where, how, ond 
-most important- .if it should be employed.  All proposed 
plans for military organization are dependent upon this 
primary critorion.  In this regard, Weigley comments: 
Universal Military Training did not die 
dramatically as a victim of sudden 
political murder, but it drifted into 
oblivion gradually.  It did so less 
because of political opposition than 
because Congress, the Defense Depart- 
ment, and the army itself lost interest 
in it.  It did so because after 1945 it 
came to seem irrelevant to America's 
military needs.12 
UMT appeared irrelevant the farther America moved from World 
War II.  The reasons were many and included the development 
of nuclear weapons and the need for delivery systems to be 
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maintained  by the Air Force,   not   the Array.     The Array's role 
became  that   of a   highly specialized  force,   basically volunteer 
professionals,   to  oontrol   the  brush-fire  conflicts of the 
13 Gold War  era. 
Even though UMT became unsuitod for American military 
needs it remained in the public eye as a possible solution. 
It cane close to adoption in 194b and again 
in 1951-1952.  In each case, however, it 
was presented as a 'long-term' program and 
was eventually sacrificed in favor of 
shorter-range proposals designed to meet 
immediate needs.  Throughout the battles 
over UMT, the Army, the Administration, 
most veterans groups, and public opinion... 
were in favor of it.  The opposition came 
from religious, educational, pacifist, 
farm, and some business groups.  Ironically, 
the opposing civilian groups, generally 
unconcerned with strategy and hostile to 
military needs, helped prevent the country 
from adopting a popular policy, backed 
by the Army, which would have been ill-   14 
suited to the military needs of the nation. 
Once again the peculiar brand of American democracy operated 
to forestall the adoption of n plan which could damage it 
beyond repair.  Undoubtedly the controversy over UMT was 
characterized by true democratic processes.  Even though it 
never faced the test of a full Congressional debate or 
national election, the issue was candidly and fully presented 
to the American people.  Public opinion favored it but popular 
will did not push for its adoption.  Traditionally slow and 
spasmodic in progress, the controversy was resolved in the 
classic manner of the United States-it quietly disappeared 
from public view until another apparent military crisis 
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awakened it.  It has, of course, been reintroduced several 
times since 194fc but never with the same vigor that the 
immediate postwar period produced.  General Eisenhower even 
in 1967 is advocating UMT as a possible solution to current 
military manpower needs.  Today, as yesterday, the solution 
is still not acceptable to America.  It is not acceptable 
for the basic reason, perhaps, that the adoption of UMT would 
uot be progress but retrogression, a denial of 200 years of 
history rather than the gateway to a safe and secure future. 
One of the be6t explanations for the rejection of 
uuiversal military training by America is found in the 
writings of Walter Millis.  Referring to UMT in general, Millis 
presented this analysis of its basic purpose: 
The essence of the 1914 European universal 
conscription sjstems was not that they per- 
mitted a small standing army to substitute 
for a big one.  Ou the contrary, their 
purpose was to make it possible to expand 
the largest practicable standing arm\ into 
something much larger still (They) were 
in no sense substitutes for lar^r standing 
armies; they were mechanisms for mobilizing 
on the first days of war trained, fully 
officered and weaponed forces on a scale 
much larger than could be maintained in time 
of peace.  But to do it, the peacetime 
establishment had to be maintained not on 
the smallest but onthe greatest possible 
scale of strength.15 
This observation reflects the crux of the issue; the paradox 
exposed to view.  If this writer may hazard a judgment, 
Universal Military Training, although presented as the basis 
of a true citizen army, is in fact the antithesis of such 
an ideal.  A system of UMT on the scale of American military 
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needs, is not suited to the philosophy or practice of democracy 
and a republican form of government.  1'reachcd as the only 
means to insure democracy and freedom, it does not meet the 
test.  UMT places too great an emphasis upon the military 
aspects and obligations of democracy and would eventually 
cause those aspects to overshadow and destroy the true goals 
of every democracy.  Equality under law is vital but when 
that law is a military chain of command, instilled from 
youth in the thoughts of the population, it contradicts 
all democratic purpose.  Ideally, security is not obtaiued 
by aruiui;,ents; practically, they are necessary evils in a 
world far from the ideal.  As long as America can survive, 
utilizing her unique method of compromise and improvisation, 
by all means let her continue to do so.  If mere survival 
becomes more important than the reason for surviving then 
it does not matter how she does it, for them will no longer 
really be any need. 
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